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Token endeavors: the significance of academic 
spin-offs in technology transfer and research 
policy in Germany 
Andreas Knie and Martin Lengwiler 
Based on the principal–agent theory, this paper analyses the historical emergence of policies supporting 
spin-off activities since the end of the Second World War, focusing on Germany as an exemplary case 
study. It argues that the significance of spin-offs in research policy is not an effect of their hard-and-
fast number or their direct economic impacts but rather of their symbolic meaning, providing 
legitimacy for academic institutions and funding agencies in controversial public debates about science 
and technological policies. Spin-offs, like technology transfer at large, are important to the rationale 
and legitimacy of science and research policy. 
nterest in spin-offs from universities and re-
search centers is booming in many regions of 
Europe (Konrad and Truffer, 2006; Larédo and 
Mustar, 2001; OECD, 2001). The topic is especially 
popular in Germany, where the recent high-tech ini-
tiative spearheaded by the federal government has 
made it a strategic objective of all research policy to 
foster an entrepreneurial climate in the science sys-
tem. In a prominent report, the German Federal Min-
istry of Education and Research confirmed the 
importance of spin-offs for current economic and 
innovation policies: “The federal government is im-
proving the conditions for start-ups and is reorganiz-
ing the financial support it offers for the founding  
of technology-centered enterprises in order to 
strengthen the dynamics for setting up ventures and 
financing innovation”. The policy programs for spin-
offs are motivated by concerns that there is too little 
‘entrepreneurial thinking’ (BMBF, 2006: 3) in the 
day-to-day German research world and that the use 
of scientific knowledge suffers from an absence of 
an environment conducive to entrepreneurship. Yet 
for all the rhetoric about the significance of spin-
offs, their absolute number in Germany is quite low. 
In general, approximately 250,000 new companies 
are added annually to the trade registry. In contrast, 
the number of spin-offs from universities and re-
search centers averages well below 1000, less than 
1% of all start-ups (Egeln et al., 2002; Potthast and 
Lengwiler, 2005). 
Why are spin-offs such favorites when objectively, 
there are so few of them? The conventional explana-
tion presents spin-offs as crucial factors in an early 
stage of the technological innovation process. Com-
pared to other companies, spin-offs are indeed re-
search intensive and account for a high number of 
patents and licenses (Egeln et al., 2002: 36–41). Since 
the 1980s, spin-offs have played an important role for 
the growth of industries, especially those in the fields 
of information technology and biotechnology (Owen-
Smith and Powell, 2003). Although derived from his-
torical precedent, today this thesis is based on a rather 
uncertain prognosis. It takes the measurable number 
of spin-offs as an indicator of the anticipated, hoped 
for, but almost immeasurable process of economic 
and technological innovation (Hemphill, 2005: 476–
477). Whether present-day spin-offs will really turn 
out to be the expected motors of innovation will only 
be certain retrospectively.  
This fundamental paradox in the assessment of 
spin-offs leaves much space for symbolic gestures in 
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science and research policy. Indeed, as argued in this 
paper, the history of spin-off policies since the 1960s 
shows that the anticipated innovation process did not 
occur in most cases. To account for the persistent 
financial support of spin-off activities in research 
policies, we suggest an alternative thesis. We argue 
that the actual function of spin-offs in research pol-
icy lies less in their hard-and-fast number or their 
direct economic impacts than in their symbolic 
meaning providing legitimacy for academic institu-
tions and funding agencies in controversial public 
debates about science and technological policies. 
Empirically, this paper focuses on the exemplary 
case of Germany and its recent science-and-
research-policy debates about technology transfers 
in general and spin-offs in particular. To situate the 
debates about spin-offs within the larger picture of 
technology transfer activities and science and re-
search policies, we take a partly historical approach 
by investigating the emergence of the spin-off issue 
since the 1960s. In the first section, we legitimate 
the choice of Germany as a case study and outline 
the basic structure of the German research system. 
We then focus on the different stages of technology 
transfer policies and debates about spin-off activities 
since the 1960s, placing the strategies in science and 
research policy in their respective historical context. 
Different sorts of material are used, including pub-
lished sources, mainly government papers and aca-
demic publications that have appeared since the 
early 1960s and have dealt with the issues of tech-
nology transfer and spin-off activities. We also re-
view recent research in the history and sociology of 
science examining the recent history of science–
industry relations in postwar Germany, notably the 
publications from the research program on the his-
tory of institutions conducting big science in Ger-
many (for a survey, see Ritter, 1992). 
Theoretically, the paper takes up recent debates 
about the relation between scientific and political 
actors in science policy. The topic’s popularity ties 
directly into some of the fundamental problems of 
science and research policy (Elzinga and Jamison, 
1995: 572– 575; Gibbons, 1999). Few other fields of 
policy are deemed so important to guaranteeing a 
country’s competitiveness, yet in no other area are 
the possibilities for direct influence through gov-
ernment policy so limited (Braun and Guston, 2003: 
306). In principle, the reasons for those fundamental 
problems of science and research policy have to do 
with the paradoxes of technology transfer: a phe-
nomenon that is manifested in Germany in an exem-
plary way. The scientific community needs public 
funding, but it also needs rights protecting it from 
interference by politicians or the public, whether in 
the process of elaborating knowledge gained from 
reflection or in the generation of applied and prod-
uct-related knowledge. Science operates in a self-
referential mode because the orientation, grounding, 
and validation of academic work come primarily 
through the disciplines, the professional communi-
ties that scientists regard as the only source of  
recognition for ‘good’ science. In dealing with sci-
ence, which works by the principle of open-ended 
results, one cannot just substantively define goals 
and outputs in the same way as in other policy fields. 
Instead, academia and government depend on mu-
tual cooperation, on what has been called a “fragile 
contract” (Guston and Keniston, 1994: 2–4): “Gov-
ernment promises to fund the basic science that peer 
reviewers find most worthy of support, and scientists 
promise that research will be performed well and 
honestly and will provide a steady stream of discov-
eries that can be translated into new products, medi-
cines, or weapons.” (Guston and Keniston, 1994: 2). 
These conditions base government policy on the 
principle of delegation. Policy-makers ‘delegate’ to 
the scientific community the delivery of the desired 
outcomes, which it then markets autonomously in its 
own name and on its own account. The direct quality 
control known in labor market and employment pol-
icy, for example, is not applicable in the area of sci-
ence policy. The classical instruments for goal 
definition and measurement of policy success or 
failure lie outside the jurisdiction of government 
policy, though policy-makers are also made respon-
sible for the results. This ‘paradox’ (Braun, 2003: 
319) means that government policy is compelled to 
find surrogate performance- and success-related in-
dicators that can legitimate the success of science 
and research policy. The principle of delegation 
rules out both direct influence on research topics and 
the imposition of quality standards on scientific 
work as instruments of control. David Guston and 
Dietmar Braun have suggested analyzing the com-
plex relations between policy-makers and scientists 
by adopting the principal–agent theory to problems 
in research policy. They expanded the principal–
agency approach to a triadic relationship between 
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policy-makers, funding agencies (or research coun-
cils), and scientists, sometimes complemented by a 
fourth party: the users (Guston, 1996; Braun and 
Guston, 2003: 304–307). In this sense, the debates 
about quality standards and assessment instruments 
can be interpreted as a negotiation process between 
the principal (politics) and the agent (science) about 
the use of public funding: a difficult and complex 
process because it involves intermediate agents such 
as funding agencies or research councils. The basic 
tension in the relation between science and politics 
focuses on the legitimacy of assessing the quality of 
scientific endeavors. Scientists themselves have a 
clear understanding of what ‘good science’ is. In 
particular, peer-reviewed essays published in inter-
national journals are regarded in all academic disci-
plines as a seal of quality. There are many other 
criteria, but all of them are based on procedural 
principles that ultimately guarantee the relevant pro-
fessional community a monopoly on the evaluation 
of the results (Simon and Knie, 2007). For policy-
makers though, the instruments for controlling and 
assessing science and research policy have to lie 
elsewhere. In this situation, technology transfer is 
virtually predestined for measuring the utility of sci-
ence and research in a publicly convincing manner. 
Spin-offs occupy a special place in the repertoire of 
technology transfer because they are empirically 
observable and measurable. They promise a high 
practical value for society. Spin-offs are seen as 
highly innovative and job-creating organizations that 
are able to adapt flexibly to a changing environment. 
They thus represent a privileged vehicle for national 
policy-makers. They are an ideal social and eco-
nomic measure of the practical value that science 
and research policies have (OECD, 2001). 
Between control and autonomy:  
science policy in Germany 
Why take Germany as a case study? One reason is 
that science and research policy in Germany is simi-
lar to that in other important nations yet also distinct 
in critical respects. Like the United States, France, 
Great Britain, and other comparable states, Germany 
has a highly elaborate publicly funded science  
system consisting of universities, other institutions 
of higher education, several pillars of research  
organizations outside the university system (mainly 
in the field of big science), and a rich tradition of 
government contract research (Ressortforschung). 
Another similarity is that academic self-organization 
is constitutionally protected in Germany and that 
academics are considered to be a well-organized 
lobby. And as in other western nations since the 
1960s, the German research system has been in-
creasingly marked by the emergence of big-science 
institutions and large research centers (Hohn and 
Schimank, 1990; Stamm, 1981). Against this back-
ground, Germany offers a typical picture of the 
problems confronting science and research policies 
in a delegated system, such as those based on the 
principal–agent situation mentioned above. 
The characteristics of the German case only exac-
erbate these policy problems. For example, the struc-
tures of the research system in Germany are far less 
centralized than those in France and Britain. The 
difference is due partly to the tradition of German 
federalism. The responsibilities in science policy are 
shared by the German federal government and the 
Länder, or states (Bentele, 1979). This tradition 
stretches back to the Second Empire of the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries but was reinforced after 
World War II by Allied reconstruction policy. With 
the decentralization of the political system after 
1945, education policy and the university system 
became a matter for the Länder alone. Government 
research funding also came solely under Länder 
management. Thus, research centers formerly run 
under the aegis of the centralized state, such as the 
Max Planck Society for the Advancement of Science 
(or its predecessor, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society) and 
the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (the major 
German foundation for research funding), were now 
totally funded from the budgets of the Länder  
(Böttger, 1993: 30–41; Hohn and Schimank, 1990: 
102–127; Stamm, 1981: 55–116). The second reason 
for the decentralized, multipolar structure of the 
German research system is the split between the 
universities and the big-science research centers out-
side the university system that constitute the so-
called ‘extra-university’ research sector. Today, the 
extra-university research organizations, the Max 
Planck Society, the Fraunhofer Society, and the Ar-
beitsgemeinschaft der Großforschungseinrichtungen 
(the association of big-science centers, since 1970 
called the Helmholtz Society), are about as large as 
the whole university system but remain largely inde-
pendent of the universities. This arrangement resem-
bles France’s division between the universities and 
the research centers of the Centre National de la Re-
cherche Scientifique (CNRS), but is completely dif-
ferent from the British and the American systems, 
with their important research universities (Hohn and 
Schimank, 1990). 
In German science and research policy, the com-
paratively weak central government therefore stands 
opposite an array of firmly rooted, well-organized, 
decentralized scientific institutions and Länder  
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governments. Recent research has therefore used the 
concept of ‘governance’ (the opposite of ‘control’) 
to account for the difficulties of political decision-
making in this field. The concept of governance is 
taken to mean all coexisting ways of collectively 
regulating social matters, ranging from the institu-
tional self-regulation of civil society and various 
forms of collaboration between government and pri-
vate actors to sovereign action taken by government 
authorities. Different modes of coordination such as 
competition, hierarchy, negotiation, and the market 
exist alongside or in interaction with each other (for 
an overview, see Jansen, 2007). This conceptual ap-
proach enables us to describe the complex structures 
in which intentional action takes place, but without 
predetermining the relationship between the objects 
and subjects of government control. The analytical 
and practical challenge for government policy, given 
the prevailing principle of delegation, is to recognize 
the potential contributions each mode can make and 
to combine them in a way that offers perspectives on 
shaping the substance of that policy (Jansen, 2007: 
212). 
However, these various modes of coordination 
may also function simultaneously, possibly resulting 
in unintended policy effects. The universities, for 
instance, cannot determine either the products of 
their teaching and research or their pay scales, much 
less their management personnel (except for a few 
cases which have recently been permitted) without 
conferring with the government. On the other hand, 
the government is prevented from influencing the 
delivery of results, so its only remaining practical 
substitute for policy consists in the processes of ne-
gotiation and coordination that have become so typi-
cal of the scientific community. In reality, not only 
are scientific evaluations being organized in the uni-
versities and the extra-university research centers, 
but business-management type instruments of qual-
ity control are being introduced as well (Münch, 
2007). 
In summary, the core identifiable problem of sci-
ence policy is that the government only has indirect 
leverage over it. Government actors delegate the 
definition of program development, content, and 
quality control to the scientific community and try to 
assert control through delineation of the general 
framework. This principle of delegation is part of the 
previously mentioned fragile contract that demands 
utmost communication, understanding, and coordi-
nation from both sides and that, if it is to continue 
functioning, always compels the government to rely 
on publicly credible surrogate indicators. “The re-
searcher will in the long term strive to achieve a po-
sition of highest possible organizational autonomy 
and lowest possible strategic interdependences.” 
(Kurek et al., 2007: 512). Spin-offs play a crucial 
role in that context because government policy and 
the scientific community alike use them as strategic 
elements to stabilize the contract (Knie et al., 2008). 
Transfer models of German research policy 
since the 1960s 
A preliminary remark on the concept of ‘spin-off’: it 
was not until the 1980s that the word spin-off ac-
quired its present meaning of a new enterprise hived 
off from an existing company or a public research 
institution. In the 1960s and 1970s, spin-off meant, 
in general, the process by which technological 
know-how and products generated by government 
research diffuse into the areas of industrial applica-
tion in the private sector. In the 1970s, this dynamic 
came to be known in the OECD countries as ‘tech-
nology transfer’. It is in this context of the 1960s and 
1970s and their changing policies of technology 
transfer that the notion of spin-offs as used today has 
been shaped. Thus historically, the concepts of spin-
off and technology transfer were closely related 
(Bräunling and Harmsen, 1976: 78–80).  
The direction of German research policy in the 
early 1960s was deeply influenced by debates about 
the presumed ‘technology gap’ between the Euro-
pean and American research systems. In those years 
the lag represented the key motive for West Ger-
many to establish federal research funding 
(Bräunling and Harmsen, 1976: 69–70; Mutert, 
2000: 32–34, 40–43). The discourse erupted over 
empirical statistics collected and published by the 
OECD, which had been created in 1961. The com-
parative data on the technological development in 
the western industrialized nations consistently 
seemed to document that the European states were 
structurally trailing the United States and Japan. The 
need to catch up was particularly strong in large-
scale and cutting-edge technologies in nuclear en-
ergy, aeronautics and space, and microelectronics. 
The OECD’s significance in the propagation of the 
notion that a gap existed is evident partly from the 
fact that its proponents were nicknamed, in the  
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jargon of science policy at the time, as ‘gapologists’ 
(Böttger, 1993: 119–121; Bräunling and Harmsen, 
1976: 72). It is from this policy background that the 
term ‘spin-off’ emerged. The word was originally 
formulated in the context of American research and 
technology policy of the 1960s and quickly spread to 
Europe, often as ‘spill-over’ or ‘fall-out’ (Bräunling 
and Harmsen, 1976: 88).  
The decisive impetus for the legitimation of West 
German research policy thus repeatedly came from 
the United States. The American debates about spin-
offs arose from the massive preponderance of mili-
tary research in research funding immediately after 
World War II. That dominance drew increasing 
criticism, for 90% of all USA federal research ex-
penditures in 1953 went on military projects. Critics 
especially objected to the lack of social and eco-
nomic utility accruing from military research. Such 
reproach achieved a change in the justification for 
investment in military research. The federal authori-
ties started to stress that the knowledge and products 
generated by military research would also benefit the 
civilian sector: as spin-offs of the military technolo-
gies (Bräunling and Harmsen, 1976: 79–80.). This 
process was initially understood to mean automatic 
diffusion that did not need to be monitored or  
promoted further.  
At the same time, the West German authorities 
also raised high public expectations of a spin-off 
effect, copying the American spin-off debate about 
the legitimation of developing large science institu-
tions. The Federal German Ministry of Scientific 
Research (BMwF), which followed from the Federal 
Ministry of Nuclear Affairs in 1962 and was respon-
sible for overseeing the country’s institutions of big 
science, legitimated the immense investment by 
pointing to the diffusion effect of technological in-
novations (Böttger, 1993: 38–41; Stamm, 1981: 
155–171). The rationale for the costs of space re-
search, for example, was spelled out in the first issue 
of the Bundesbericht Forschung (Federal Research 
Report), a publication initiated by the research min-
istry in 1965 and published at regular intervals ever 
since.1 The argument was that the “technical experi-
ences with missiles, space vehicles, and ground in-
stallations (…) are of great economic importance 
because they involve ultramodern technical experi-
ences that can be successfully exploited outside 
space-flight technology as well (…).” (BMwF, 
1965: 121; our translation). Analogously, the BMwF 
legitimated the expenditures for defense research by 
holding out hope for a technological thrust. In the 
ministry’s words: “Crucial technical knowledge and 
discoveries of the past 30 years have their origin in 
defense research, including radar, control technolo-
gies, information and computer technology, the use 
of nuclear energy, aeronautics and space, [and] busi-
ness and systems research” (BMwF, 1965: 61; our 
translation). 
This idea of legitimating research costs by pointing 
to passive spin-offs met with broad political and  
social acceptance, enjoying support in the 1960s from 
governments led by the center-right parties (the Chris-
tian Democrats (CDU) and members of the Bavarian 
sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU)). After 
1966 this backing continued under a grand coalition 
between the CDU and the center-left party, the Social 
Democrats (SPD) (Bräunling and Harmsen, 1976: 
80–81). The business associations and the relevant 
scientific institutions also embraced it, a hardly sur-
prising response because the government institutes 
and their industrial partners alike profited from the 
model of big science and its considerable funding. 
Thus, public and private parties involved in big sci-
ence were interested in broad popular acceptance of 
this line of research (Bräunling and Harmsen, 1976: 
81; Mutert, 2000: 193–223). 
Even then, the actual impact of assumed spin-offs 
was very small. In the 1970s, estimates for West 
Germany rested on the assumption that only about 
10% of the investments in institutions pursuing big 
science paid-off in economically useful innovation 
(Bräunling and Harmsen, 1976: 81). A survey of 
participating industrial enterprises in the 1970s 
found that the utility of research projects was seen to 
lie primarily in the marketing area, in the enhanced 
reputation gained through involvement in prestigious 
European projects, rather than in the technological 
know-how that was generated (Bräunling and Harm-
sen, 1976: 206–207). 
Science policy with an interventionist 
agenda: the planning euphoria around 1970 
The advent of the Grand Coalition in the Federal 
Republic of Germany (1966–1969) heralded the 
emergence of a proactive stance on science and re-
search policy. Although support for science and re-
search was still intended to help improve the 
competitiveness of the national economy, it was  
also expected to enhance the quality of life 
(Szöllösi-Janze, 1990: 88–94). In 1968 the reasons 
for a reorientation of West German federal science 
policy were laid out by the country’s minister of re-
search, Gerhard Stoltenberg. He cited the experience 
with the economic crisis that had brought the 
lengthy boom in the economy to an end as of the 
mid-1960s, preparing the ground for an intervention-
ist concept of the state. Moreover, he emphasized 
that it was necessary to have a “constant, flexible 
adaptation of government expenditures (…) given 
the present economic facts” and that scientific re-
search therefore had to be planned more thoroughly. 
He also stated that these policies required “com-
pletely new forms of close, institutional cooperation 
between the government, the scientific community, 
and business, the determination to overcome tradi-
tional limitations and mistaken thinking about auton-
omy” (Stoltenberg, 1968: 93; our translation). 
From today’s perspective, this passage expresses a 
remarkable push for active government participation 
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in the development of scientific knowledge and a 
sign of just how fragile the contract between acade-
mia and the government actually was in times of 
crisis. In the 1969 Federal Research Report, it was 
inferred that “partial collaboration between the gov-
ernment, the scientific community, and business in 
research planning and funding” was no longer suffi-
cient (BMwF, 1969: 36; our translation). Faced with 
the insistence of universities and research organiza-
tions on the autonomous self-governance of science, 
the BMwF subsequently ceased efforts to coordinate 
and to set priorities within the federal funding  
programs.  
The research ministry reoriented its strategy, mak-
ing the socioeconomic relevance of research results 
the pivotal criterion, though that was not operation-
alized in precise terms. The call sounded by the 
1967 Federal Research Report read accordingly: 
“Research policy must not be guided solely by [the 
goal of] closing gaps. It must henceforth focus more 
intensely and more consistently on the tasks upon 
whose solution the continued development of soci-
ety and the economy especially depend.” (BMwF, 
1967: 7; our translation). This new strategy was 
manifested partly in new funding priorities intended 
to encourage the development of new key cutting-
edge technologies regarded as relevant to the future 
in areas beyond the classical fields of big science. 
The technology-transfer models used up to 1969 
were redefined in the rhetoric of the SPD–Liberal 
coalition that came to power in West Germany 
thereafter (Szöllösi-Janze, 1990: 78–80). The back-
ground of this reorientation in science policy was an 
increasingly critical attitude toward the first genera-
tion of spin-offs, particularly in the United States. 
Here, skepticism about the purported diffusion effect 
was already growing in the early 1960s, especially in 
military research and the NASA space program. In 
response to the resulting criticism, various research 
institutions, particularly NASA, decided to pursue 
the diffusion of technological innovations more in-
tensely than before and start an active policy on 
spin-offs (Bräunling and Harmsen, 1976: 199–203; 
NASA, 2002, 3–4). Moreover, spin-off policies 
gradually shifted beyond institutions of big science. 
Studies on the effectiveness of enterprising spin-
offs, most of them in Boston (Route 128) or the San 
Francisco Bay area (Palo Alto and Silicon Valley), 
first appeared in the mid-1960s in the United States 
and showed that a host of new technology firms had 
sprung up in the immediate vicinity of universities 
and research centers (Bräunling and Harmsen, 1976: 
85; Berndts and Harmsen, 1985: 21–25; for an early 
secondary analysis, see Keune and Nathusius, 1977: 
17–20). These university-related spin-off companies 
gave rise to important regional economic centers, 
such as Silicon Valley around Stanford University 
(Keune and Nathusius, 1977: 17–20). Because of the 
regional economic significance of these centers, 
Great Britain and France began trying to copy this 
model in the 1960s by launching public funding 
programs (e.g. Cambridge, Milton Keynes, and 
Sophia-Antipolis near Antibes) (Keune and  
Nathusius, 1977:14–15, 65–68). In West Germany, 
however, such projects were not possible until much 
later, in the late 1980s. 
Responding to a parliamentary question in 1972, 
the federal government stated that it was abandoning 
the rather passive approach it had been taking. “The 
federal government considers it better to channel 
funding directly to tasks that are socially and eco-
nomically important and promise technological suc-
cess than to inflate expectations about the utility of the 
more or less random byproducts of research (the so-
called fallout)” (as cited in Bräunling and Harmsen, 
1976: 82; our translation).2 This open admission that 
previous policy had been merely symbolic made it 
possible to establish the term ‘technology transfer’ 
successfully and to legitimate and ensure its long-
term extension beyond big science to include practi-
cally all areas of research and technology policy. 
The new policy signaled a shift in the target audi-
ence of technology transfer, with small business and 
academic spin-offs figuring prominently along the 
way (Bräunling and Harmsen, 1976: 85–92). 
Technology transfer as a strategy for  
legitimating science: the debate about  
models of active transfer in the 1970s 
The German federal government’s announcement 
that it wished to rein in the hitherto operative princi-
ple of delegation forced the scientific community to 
respond. Representatives of scientific institutions 
and defenders of academic self-organization very 
soon managed to convince government proponents 
that their interventionist project was impossible.  
Peter Glotz, a renowned German scientist and sci-
ence politician, wrote in his autobiography how well 
organized the academic networks were. The repre-
sentatives of the important funding institutions suc-
ceeded in framing the planned inroads on academic 
self-government as massive intervention in academic 
freedom. With a few efficient and informal back-
room discussions, they managed to reverse the in-
tended government policies. A central factor was 
that these meetings were attended by only a handful 
of men, most of whom belonged to the generation 
brought up during and immediately after World 
War II and marked by a specific culture of consen-
sus (Glotz, 2005: 150). Another likely reason that 
their minds met so quickly was that they came to 
agree on pragmatic and coordinated forms of gov-
ernance and created a “complex cooperative system” 
(Szöllösi-Janze, 1990: 82) of various actors who, 
above all, practiced informal concertation among 
themselves from then on. To forge an early under-
standing on principles and strategies of research pol-
icy, the research ministry under Stoltenberg 
convened the leading figures of this new steering 
group, which later became known as the ‘Holy  
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Alliance’, for their inaugural meeting as an informal 
advisory body. It consisted of the presidents from 
the Conference of University Presidents, the Max 
Planck Society, the Wissenschaftsrat (German Sci-
ence Council), and the Deutsche Forschungsgemein-
schaft (German Research Foundation). This 
arrangement reestablished the principle of delega-
tion, making the government dependent once again 
on surrogate criteria for measuring the success of 
science policy (Szöllösi-Janze, 1990: 84–88). 
In the course of this ultimately successful attempt 
to defend the freedom of academic self-management 
and to secure the reciprocal advantages of the con-
tract, the scientific institutions saw themselves in-
creasingly compelled to improve their own public 
communication of what they were actually doing. To 
safeguard academic self-management and hence also 
the principle of delegation in science policy, they 
began to provide their own evidence of the useful-
ness of their research. The representatives of the  
major funding agencies like the German Research 
Foundation and of the extra-university research or-
ganizations had realized that active engagement in 
the process of planning and implementing the public 
research programs was a very effective way of 
bringing in the interests of scientists. A series of re-
search programs thus included advisory boards and 
working groups, in which the specific interests of 
scientists were melded with those voiced by the rep-
resentatives of the federal research ministry. In addi-
tion, the research centers of big science started their 
own information campaigns to inform the general 
public about the topics and the products of their own 
expensive research infrastructure (Laudel, 2006; 
Zuckermann and Merton 1971: 66–100; Daele et al., 
1979: 32–34).  
As a result, a multitude of new centers and in-
struments for facilitating technology transfers 
emerged. In keeping with the federal structure of the 
West German science system, the process proceeded 
in a very decentralized and nonuniform manner. The 
extra-university research organizations (the Max 
Planck, the Fraunhofer, and the Helmholtz Societies) 
were the first to create their own offices for technol-
ogy transfer. The technical universities did so later, 
with the other universities finally following suit in 
the 1980s along with the technical colleges (the 
Fachhochschulen) specialized in a single discipline, 
such as engineering, architecture, design, art, or 
business administration (see Rupp, 1976: 92–104). 
For years, however, the scientific institutions and 
the research ministry disagreed on the pace and stra-
tegic orientation of transfer policy. As was basically 
clear to all parties, the logical need for the constantly 
escalating expenditures for research and develop-
ment had to be conveyed to the public more effec-
tively than in the past, in order to avoid jeopardizing 
the rules of the contract between the scientific  
community and government policy. But whereas the 
Max Planck Society, for example, actually set about 
optimizing the economic exploitation of its research 
results, the big-science research centers in particular 
were more interested in a symbolic policy (Mutert, 
2000: 70–87). As the offices for technology transfer 
multiplied, the research ministry itself was doing 
everything possible to keep from losing further 
ground in the science institutions and to avoid even 
being excluded from a future role in measures for 
achieving legitimation.  
The confusion wrought by this melee is well appar-
ent in the discussions that Margit Szöllösi-Janze and 
Susanne Mutert studied with regard to the changing 
licensing and patent policies in the Helmholtz re-
search centers during the 1960s and 1970s. Although 
the Helmholtz Society had been exploring ways of 
expanding the commercial use of technology since 
the mid-1960s, the research centers and institutes 
disagreed with each other and with the federal re-
search ministry on how to improve the lackluster 
patenting and licensing policies. Having the closest 
industrial links, the Jülich research institutes (the 
Society for Nuclear Processes and the Jülich Nuclear 
Research Station) began in 1966 to call for a policy 
of active exploitation of patents. Until that time, the 
commercialization of patents followed a decentral-
ized and non-exclusive license policy in which the 
research centers were themselves responsible for the 
marketing of their innovations. As the main funding 
institution, the national government owned the pref-
erential rights for the commercial use of patents. 
However, the rights were non-exclusive and the re-
search centers could also sign licensing contracts 
with industrial partners, although again only in a 
non-exclusive form. Within this non-exclusive and 
decentralized framework, both potential patent users, 
the government and the industry, had hardly any 
incentives for licensing research innovations 
(Mutert, 2000: 72–73). Since the mid-1960s this pol-
icy was increasingly criticized, although with differ-
ent interests. Some active research centers, such as 
the Jülich center, demanded a better coordination of 
the patent policy, the Helmholtz Society claimed a 
centralization of the transfer activities in its own 
hands, and the research ministry tried to avoid the 
misuse of publicly funded research products for pri-
vate commercial interests. Thus, the research minis-
try remained skeptical about the arguments of the 
Jülich center and its close relations to the industry 
(Mutert, 2000: 73–78). Big science was still the sole 
area of federal activity in the science system. Even-
tually in 1967 a poor compromise, on which the 
Helmholtz Society and the research ministry eventu-
ally agreed, resulted. It demonstrated how far the 
technology transfer debate of the 1970s was already 
merely a symbolic gesture. The Helmholtz Society 
started a central patent database through which all 
big-science centers had to list their annually regis-
tered patents. The information in the database was 
published and provided to interested industrial  
partners (Mutert, 2000: 73–78; Szöllösi-Janze,  
1990: 75–77). As non-exclusive patent law was  
not changed, the industry’s interest in the patent 
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database remained negligible. 1975–1978 showed 
that only one licensing agreement came of the 
17,000 published patents in the central database of 
the Helmholtz Society. The database merely served 
to acquire legitimacy and was finally closed in 1988 
(Mutert, 2000: 88–89). 
The reservations of the Helmholtz Society about 
actively marketing their intellectual properties and a 
respective support of spin-offs is further illustrated 
by the foundation of the Garching Instrumente 
GmbH, the patent exploitation company of the Max 
Planck Society, in 1971. Pointedly, this initiative 
came from exponents of the Helmholtz Society who 
were unhappy with the society’s passive policies of 
technology transfer. The Institute for Plasmaphysics 
in particular, which futilely fought for a more active 
transfer policy within the Helmholtz community, left 
the Helmholtz Society in 1970 and switched to the 
Max Planck Society partly because it favored the 
profit-oriented patent policies of some Max Planck 
institutes. The Max Planck Society embraced its new 
member with open arms and took the enlargement as 
an opportunity to found a new technology transfer 
office, the Garching Instrumente GmbH. The emer-
gence of Garching was an important institutional 
step. With it, the Max Planck Society became the 
first among the extra-university research organiza-
tions to have a centralized institution for an active 
transfer policy (Mutert, 2000: 78–81).  
Modest outcomes: anchoring technology 
transfer in recent federal funding policies 
The necessity of research funding based on the prin-
ciple of delegation grew steadily in the 1970s, as the 
funding of big science continued to play a key role 
within Germany’s federal research policy. With the 
increasing investments in research, the pressure for 
legitimating the financial expenses by the expected 
profits of technology transfers was also rising. The 
institutes and centers of big science were the only 
recourse the federal government had in science pol-
icy to establish focal points in research funding pro-
grams without becoming mired in constitutional 
conflict with the Länder. Meanwhile, the high costs 
and spectacular fiascos of specific big-science pro-
jects, combined with the lacking profits of technol-
ogy transfers, continually made the funding of big 
science a target of public criticism. More than one 
project ended as an investment failure in the 1960s 
and 1970s, examples being: the vertical take-off air-
plane; the development of the quick breeder nuclear 
reactor, the high-temperature reactor, and a gigantic 
windmill; and the booster rocket program of the 
European Launcher Development Organisation 
(Kommission für wirtschaftlichen und sozialen 
Wandel, 1977: 253–255; Szöllösi-Janze, 1990:  
278–279). The few efforts at technology transfer, 
which were merely symbolic in any case, fizzled 
without effect (Mutert, 2000: 61–62). Moreover, 
expansion of the BMFT’s budget for institutes of big 
science, especially for nuclear energy, ceased after 
1973 because of recession, and the career paths of 
young scientists heading to big-science research cen-
ters were blocked indefinitely by job cuts (Mutert, 
2000: 108–110; Szöllösi-Janze, 1990: 214–215). 
Under these conditions both the federal research 
ministry and the Helmholtz Society sought to stress 
the economic and social utility of the research in-
vestments. When controversy over an active patent 
and licensing policy failed to be resolved in the 
1960s, the view slowly but surely prevailed that it 
was necessary to couple science and industry more 
closely in order to legitimate research policy. The 
sensational failures demonstrated to both the federal 
research ministry and the general public that the po-
tential of academic self-government was very lim-
ited, at least for research programs with costly 
technical infrastructure. The big-science institutions 
lacked all appropriate management qualifications 
and governance experiences. The conclusion was 
that academic institutions should receive no new 
funding for programs of technological innovation 
without close cooperation with industrial partners 
(Szöllösi-Janze, 1990: 217–218). Even the BMFT 
overcame its skepticism of licensing policy based on 
exclusive guarantees, like the one adopted by the 
Max Planck Society. As of 1977, the ministry went 
still further, explicitly recommending the Garching 
model of the Max Planck Society as exemplary 
(Mutert, 2000: 84). 
A real milestone in the restructuring of the rela-
tion between public policy and science was finally 
reached in 1978 with the so-called two-thirds rule. 
As an incentive for big-science research centers to 
exploit the results of their research, this provision at 
last made it permissible for two-thirds of their addi-
tional revenue from the sale of licenses to be re-
ported as profit and retained in their own budgets. In 
the line-item logic underlying the canons of public 
budgeting, the licensing revenues until then had the 
effect of reducing subsidies, leaving the centers with 
no financial interest in a proactive licensing policy. 
Being allowed to keep up to two-thirds of those 
revenues to cover spending on technology transfer 
henceforth increased the motivation to institutional-
ize and professionalize transfer activities. Further-
more, exclusive licensing agreements were now 
allowed within the Helmholtz Society (Szöllösi-
Janze, 1990: 280–218).  
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The debates leading to the new regime show the 
same camps as the discussions about the patent and 
licensing policy in the 1960s: the research centers 
asked for more autonomy when dealing with indus-
try partners, the association of big-science research 
centers hoped for a centralization, and the research 
ministry acted against any misappropriation of pub-
lic funds for commercial profits. The shift from the 
previous regime to the two-thirds rule was made 
possible by a combination of factors: the increasing 
pressure on improving the conditions of technology 
transfers, which helped to gradually change the atti-
tude of the federal research ministry, but also a cen-
tralization process of the association of big-science 
research centers which led in 1970 to the foundation 
of the Helmholtz Society (Bräunling and Harmsen, 
1976: 90–91; see also: Mutert, 2000: 100–101). 
As early as the 1970s, research centers were now 
granted entrepreneurial scope to engage in economic 
activities essential for legitimating research policy 
directly on their own. After the creation of the 
Fraunhofer institutes, the research ministry succeeded 
yet again in firmly tying the need for research utility 
to the institutional conditions of research work. Basi-
cally, the mutual understanding on the problems of 
legitimating public funding and modern research 
conditions gradually expanded from the mid-1970s 
onwards. The federal research ministry realized that 
visible output of the big-science research centers 
depended on the ministry’s willingness to address 
the self-interests of the individual research organiza-
tions in its policies: something that the Helmholtz 
Society had long been calling for. Under increasing 
public pressure for tangible results of the costly in-
vestments in big science, the research ministry came 
to accept the demands of the research centers 
(Szöllösi-Janze, 1990: 281). The principle of delega-
tion was left untouched, but the informal modes of 
negotiation led to a substantial change in the rules of 
scientific work for the first time. 
Overall, the two-thirds rule was successful. In the 
first four years (1978–1982), it brought the big-
science research centers additional revenues of 
nearly €23 million, mainly profiting the technology 
transfer offices of the institutes and centers. By 1981 
all Helmholtz research centers had a transfer office, 
or at least a professional transfer officer (Mutert, 
2000: 148–149). 
The previous disasters of the major science pro-
jects and the lack of success with technology trans-
fer had still further impacts (Szöllösi-Janze, 1990: 
210–213). Empirical results in the early 1970s, espe-
cially from the evaluation research organized by the 
newly founded Fraunhofer Institute for Systems 
Technology and Innovation Research, changed the 
transfer strategies in two regards. First, the primarily 
technology-oriented transfer approaches of the pe-
riod were complemented by person-centered funding 
models. It became apparent that the transfer of new 
products, processes, and know-how often functioned 
inadequately for lack of implicit knowledge, 
whereas the transfer of persons proved to be more 
positive. The trend toward person-centered transfers 
no doubt also profited from the funding cuts at the 
research centers and from the attendant pressure on 
the workforce to change jobs. At least in the area of 
big science, many institutes encouraged personnel to 
move to the business sector, the ulterior motive be-
ing that harsher measures to cut personnel could 
thereby be avoided (Mutert, 2000: 104–107). 
The second change in research policy concerned 
the private-sector target audience of technology 
transfer. Up to that time it was big industry that prof-
ited most from cooperation with public research in-
stitutions. The networks between big science and big 
industry in particular had traditionally been close-
knit and effective, not least because of the complex 
technological tasks with which the industrial part-
ners in big-science research centers were charged. In 
1971, 80% of the funding for industrial research 
within big science programs (mostly aeronautics and 
space research) went to enterprises with more than 
5000 employees (Kommission für wirtschaftlichen 
und sozialen Wandel, 1977: 252–253, 283–284; for 
information on the 1980s, see Duisberg, 1983). The 
small and medium-size enterprises were definitely at 
a disadvantage in research policy. The structural 
shift from the large-scale research conducted within 
the technology programs of the 1950s and 1960s to 
the funding of new technologies in the 1970s had 
also entailed a change in industrial cooperation. 
Many of the new research priorities, such as envi-
ronmental research, microelectronics, and biotech-
nology, no longer necessarily required cooperation 
with big industry. That type of work could be done 
in collaboration with small and medium-size enter-
prises (Szöllösi-Janze, 1990: 294). 
These two trends in technology transfer (person-
centeredness and the orientation to small and  
medium-size industrial organizations) merged with 
various new funding programs of the research minis-
try from the late 1970s onwards. Some of them 
dated back to that time’s coalition between the SPD 
and the Liberals; others, to the CDU-led government 
that ruled as of 1982. The programs were designed 
to provide direct funding for spin-offs from universi-
ties and public research institutions as well as from 
private industry and were intended to strengthen the 
contact between public research and the sector of 
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small and medium-size industry. In the period 1977–
1983, the BMFT began experimenting with a  
program on ‘technology-based business start-ups’. 
People or organizations interested in founding an 
enterprise could, with only a modest amount of their 
own money, apply for public funding covering up to 
90% of the required start-up capital. 
By today’s standards, these arrangements were 
very generous. The federal ministry had meanwhile 
realized that it wasn’t enough to promote spin-offs if 
the number of newly founded enterprises did not 
eventually increase—as indeed it did not. Moreover, 
the ministry was still unable to intervene directly in 
the development of research programs of the big 
research institutions. It still depended on indirect 
measures to increase the quality of publicly funded 
research. In the 1980s and 1990s, the research minis-
try therefore started to include industry in the incen-
tive systems of its research programs. The problem 
was that most of the successful start-ups still came 
from the private sector. For academics at the univer-
sities and public research institutions, moving into 
entrepreneurial science seemed to be associated with 
a loss of status in the community of scholars, at least 
in the early 1980s (Mutert, 2000: 116–120; for an 
example pertaining to mathematics and data-
processing, see Wiegand, 1994: 250–274). The pro-
grams were not completely ineffective, however. By 
1984 the big-science research centers were credited 
with a total of 84 spin-offs funded by the BMFT  
(for individual examples, see BMFT 1983, Vol. 1:  
124–127, 177–183; for the total figures, see Mutert, 
2000: 113; see also Berndts and Harmsen, 1985; 
Heidrich and Klein, 1997: 18–19). 
Conclusions 
The question of why the significance of spin-offs 
has been stressed politically although their actual 
number has remained so low can now be answered. 
Spin-offs, like technology transfer at large, are im-
portant to the rationale and legitimacy of science and 
research policy. In other words, spin-offs demon-
strate the utility of the federal government’s science 
policy and serve as a response to a multitude of 
structural problems in science and research policy. 
In the terms of the principal–agent theory mentioned 
in the introduction: spin-offs are a way to deal with 
some of the delegation problems of the relation  
between the principal (namely the state and the gov-
ernment actors in science and research policy), some 
intermediary actors such as the funding agencies and 
the research councils, and the agent (the scientists 
and research institutes; Braun and Guston, 2003: 
303). The persistence of the public debate over spin-
offs in the past decades has to do with the ambiva-
lence of the phenomenon. Spin-offs can be used by 
both actors: by the principal to assess the achieve-
ments of the agent, measured in the degree of utility 
of the research output, and by the agent in order to 
legitimate the research activities by pointing at its 
commercial potentials. This ambivalence is the main 
reason why much of the debate about spin-offs suf-
fers from an overdose of rhetorical and symbolic 
arguments.  
Thus, even after more than 40 years of debate 
about technology transfer, spin-off activities have 
not lost their edge as a crucial element of the often 
token endeavors of government authorities and sci-
entific organizations. In the 1960s the research min-
istry’s call for international technology transfer 
(oriented to American large-scale research) war-
ranted the development of large-scale research by 
the Federal Republic of Germany and, indirectly, an 
expansion of the federal government’s authority vis-
à-vis the Länder. Since the recession of 1966–1967, 
discourse about technology transfer has increasingly 
reflected the attempt to cope with the structural 
problems of big-science institutions, often by  
reforming the external relations of the research cen-
ters. The structural problems included the transfor-
mation of traditional large-scale technologies for 
developing modern technologies, big industry’s 
dominance over small and medium-size industry in 
research cooperation, and pressures to cut jobs and 
costs in research centers. In the 1980s the discussion 
of transfer concepts in research policy were increas-
ingly marked by economic policies reflecting the 
doom conveyed by the economic outlooks since the 
recession of 1973–1974. In addition, technology 
transfer was presented as an antidote to small busi-
ness’s lack of innovation and as a catalyst of eco-
nomic transformation in structurally weak regions. 
In recent years spin-offs have been considered evi-
dence of a generally innovation-friendly research 
environment (WR, 2007). 
However, the low number of academic spin-offs 
demonstrates that government science policy is  
limited in its ability to substantiate the utility of  
research. Thus paradoxically, the persisting signifi-
cance of spin-offs in science and research policy is 
not an indicator for diminished tensions between the 
principal (politics) and the agent (science), rather the 
opposite. The contract between government and sci-
ence will remain fragile as long as the cooperation is 
based on the principle of delegation, as it still is to-
day (though its main supporters are now found in the 
academic institutions rather than among government 
authorities as in the 1950s and 1960s). The effec-
tiveness of policy instruments for exerting external 
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and indirect influence depends on the academic 
community’s acceptance of the indicators and per-
formance parameters defined by government policy 
and on their recognition as a guide for scientific 
work. This acceptance exists only if the academic 
institutions agree to the given objectives at least for 
tactical reasons. In particular, the political attempts 
in the early 1970s to intervene directly in the sub-
stance of research and to orient scientific goals to 
social problems failed because these policies were 
interpreted by the academic world as an annulment 
of the delegation contract. 
The characteristic features of a community of 
scholars working autonomously toward open-ended 
results necessitate methods of greater subtlety in 
research policy. Recent results of sociological stud-
ies on the conditions under which modern modes of 
knowledge production take place (Knie and Simon, 
2006; Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz, 1998; Nowotny 
et al., 2001) show that the regulations of line-item 
accounting, which apply to practically all scientific 
organizations in Germany, are the institutional cor-
set for the academic community’s internal orienta-
tion. Research, which is organized primarily in an 
autonomous and self-referential setting, is funded 
by a budget system that is outright impervious to 
external stimuli so that scientific work is protected 
as a ‘public good’. In this system, revenues in 
terms of valuable give-and-take with partners out-
side the institutional boundaries become an admin-
istrative problem and are therefore anticipated and 
officially avoided from the outset: when the re-
search design is defined. In the world of line-item 
budgeting, stimuli and incentives that help extend 
the chain of epistemological value creation beyond 
one’s academic peers through interaction with ac-
tors from business and industry and that can be 
budgeted as revenues are regarded as dangerous 
adventures. 
But if efforts succeed at opening up academia’s 
institutional terrain and making the mutual transfer 
of knowledge attractive, entrepreneurial initiative 
can become a legitimate part of scientific practice 
and can translate more quickly, directly, and  
diversely into products and enterprises than is pres-
ently the case. Scientific quality will also be en-
hanced by the fact that dialectical interactions 
between research and application are made possible 
by various testing and validation authorities. The 
essential thing is the acceptance of such ‘cross-
overs’ within the community of scholars and the ac-
knowledgment of the results as part of good science. 
Recent findings support the thesis that the new 
forms of knowledge production are highly receptive 
to such an arrangement for institutions governed by 
public law (Bercovitz and Feldmann, 2006; Murray, 
2004). Spin-offs would not be token endeavors of 
technology transfer based on symbolic policy but 
rather part of a modern approach to the production 
of science and knowledge, one arising from a reform 
of science policy. 
Notes 
1. Since the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, 
successive portfolios, each with a different title and scope, 
have been responsible for research, science, technology, edu-
cation, other matters pertaining to the academic community 
(e.g. funding and relations with business and industry), or 
some partial combination of these areas. The names relevant 
in this paper are the Ministry of Scientific Research (BMwF, 
1963–1972), the Ministry of Research and Technology (BMFT, 
1972–1994), and the Ministry of Education and Research 
(BMBF, 1994–present). In this paper we also refer to this gov-
ernment function generically as the research ministry.  
2.  In the 1960s and 1970s the term ‘fallout’ meant a form of  
passive spin-off (see Mutert, 2000: 60). 
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